Abstract
We study how market power impacts the efficiency and redistributive properties of sin taxation, with an empirical application to sugar-sweetened beverage taxation. We estimate an equilibrium model of the UK drinks market, which we embed in a tax design framework to solve for optimal sugar-sweetened beverage tax policy. Positive price-cost margins for drinks create inefficiencies that lower the optimal rate compared with a perfectly competitive setting. Since profits mainly accrue to the rich, this is partially mitigated under social preferences for equity. Overall, ignoring market power when setting tax policy leads to welfare gains 40 percent below those at the optimum. (JEL D62, H21, H23, H25, L13, L25, L66)
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
