Abstract
The cost structure of natural monopoly (economies of scale and scope) characterization of first and second best optimality surplus subsidy schemes for attaining first-best optimality Ramsey prices and the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism for attaining them time-of-use (TOU) prices and Riordan's mechanisms for attaining the optimal TOU prices multipart and self-selecting tariffs, and Sibley's method for using self-selecting tariffs to achieve optimality the Averch-Johnson model of how rate-of-return regulation induces inefficiencies analysis of regulation based on the firm's return on output, costs, or sales. Price-cap regulation regulatory treatment of uncertainty and its impact on the firm's behaviour methods of attaining optimality without direct regulation (contestability, auctioning the monopoly franchise).
Published Version
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