Optimal production cooperation strategies for automakers considering different sales channels under dual credit policy

Abstract

The dual credit policy has significantly facilitated the market penetration of new energy vehicles. However, the best strategy for production collaboration, particularly when considering diverse sales channels, remains underexplored. In this study, a duopolistic market scenario is examined where a new energy vehicle automaker sells directly to end-users and a fuel vehicle automaker resells to consumers through a car dealer. We developed a game-theoretical model to analyze optimal decisions under three distinct strategies: pure competition (pc), commission sales (cs), and mixed production (mp). The findings are as follows: (1) The new energy vehicle credits rate and fuel consumption standards exhibit similar effects. While impacting the range effort levels minimally, these standards notably reduce the fuel-saving rate of fuel vehicles, questioning the efficiency of restrictive policies. (2) With the rise in credit trading prices, there is an increase in equilibrium decisions and profits for both the pc and mp strategies, suggesting that higher credit prices incentivize automakers to optimize their strategies, leading to better results. (3) The strategic choice of the automakers is heavily influenced by the credit trading price. The energy vehicle automaker tends to prefer the pc strategy, while the fuel vehicle automaker's preference alternates between mp and cs, depending on market conditions.