Abstract

The development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is one of the effective ways to alleviate carbon emissions, environmental pollution, and energy scarcity in the transportation sector. The Chinese government has innovatively proposed the "dual credit policy," but it is still a hot topic whether it can promote the NEVs' technological innovation. In this study, we construct game models and obtain the technological innovation strategies for NEVs under the dual credit policy, considering that the NEV supply chain contains one manufacturer and N suppliers. Further, we construct bargaining game models and study how to encourage manufacturers and suppliers to enhance technological innovation, realize supply chain coordination, and give the alliance strategy to maximize suppliers' profit. We found that the dual credit policy can effectively stimulate technological innovation, and the higher the credit price or technological innovation credit factor, the higher the technical level of NEVs. The findings could guide the government to adjust and revise the policy. Second, we found that the bargaining games could coordinate the NEV supply chain so that decentralized enterprises can achieve optimal technological innovation under centralized decision-making. Third, we found that suppliers can improve their profits by choosing a suitable alliance strategy under the manufacturer's different negotiating power.

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