Abstract
We investigate the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game on the simplest spatial networks constructed as geometrical graphs. The optimal cooperation enhancement against the topology randomness is found. It is proposed that the optimal behavior of the cooperation results from the competition between individuals with high degrees and with low degrees: the former assists the formation of cooperator clusters and the latter tends to prevent the formation of such clusters.
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