Diverse strategy-learning styles promote cooperation in evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Abstract

Observational learning and practice learning are two important learning styles and play important roles in our information acquisition. In this paper, we study a spacial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game, where players can choose the observational learning rule or the practice learning rule when updating their strategies. In the proposed model, we use a parameter p controlling the preference of players choosing the observational learning rule, and found that there exists an optimal value of p leading to the highest cooperation level, which indicates that the cooperation can be promoted by these two learning rules collaboratively and one single learning rule is not favor the promotion of cooperation. By analysing the dynamical behavior of the system, we find that the observational learning rule can make the players residing on cooperative clusters more easily realize the bad sequence of mutual defection. However, a too high observational learning probability suppresses the players to form compact cooperative clusters. Our results highlight the importance of a strategy-updating rule, more importantly, the observational learning rule in the evolutionary cooperation.