Abstract

This paper studies the problem of optimal channel design. For a given input probability distribution and for hard and soft design constraints, the aim here is to design a (probabilistic) channel whose output leaks minimally from its input. To analyse this problem, general notions of entropy and information leakage are introduced. It can be shown that, for all notions of leakage here defined, the optimal channel design problem can be solved using convex programming with zero duality gap. Subsequently, the optimal channel design problem is studied in a game-theoretical framework: games allow for analysis of optimal strategies of both the defender and the adversary. It is shown that all channel design problems can be studied in this game-theoretical framework, and that the defender’s Bayes–Nash equilibrium strategies are equivalent to the solutions of the convex programming problem. Moreover, the adversary’s equilibrium strategies correspond to a robust inference problem.

Highlights

  • A channel is defined as a conditional distribution, modelling the probability of outputs that an adversary can observe given secret inputs

  • Based on Reference [2], it can be shown that, for any choice of the entropy measure, this problem is solved via convex programming with zero duality gap, for which the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions can be used to solve for the optimal channel

  • We investigated the problem of designing constrained channels that leak minimally about their input in a general information-theoretical setting

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Summary

Introduction

A channel is defined as a conditional distribution, modelling the probability of outputs that an adversary can observe given secret inputs. An optimal channel can be seen as an optimal countermeasure to information leakage To explore this design problem, one needs to specify what constraints should be considered and how the leakage of information is quantified. In the cryptographic example above, one may want, for example, to design a channel of minimal leakage (in terms of the number of key bits that can be reconstructed by an adversary) under the constraint that the average encryption per block should take less time than some given duration. Hard constraints are the ones establishing which outputs are allowed given each inputs. Based on Reference [2], it can be shown that, for any choice of the entropy measure, this problem is solved via convex programming with zero duality gap, for which the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions can be used to solve for the optimal channel

Literature Review
Contributions
Roadmap
Notational Conventions and Preliminaries
Entropy
Posterior Entropy
Gain Functions and g-Leakage
Optimal Channel Design
Optimal Channel Design is Convex Programming
Game-Theoretical Interpretation
Nash Equilibria and Saddle-Point Strategies
The Adversary’s Problem
Measure-Invariant Optimality
Uncertainty about the Prior
Discussion
Conclusions and Future Work
Full Text
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