Abstract

Abstract : This monograph will determine the role of naval forces in land operations at the operational level of war. In the past decades, military failures were perceived by Congress as a result of the inability of the services to work effectively together. Legislation chartered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint warfighting doctrine and institute reforms. Preceding this legislation, the services separately developed warfighting concepts in the Army' AirLand Battle Doctrine and the Navy's Maritime Strategy. This paper will examine the theoretical basis of operational maneuver and fires, and determine whether naval capabilities are compatible with these operational concepts. The criteria to determine the feasibility of employing naval assets as an operational maneuver force will be initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. The criteria to determine whether naval assets can provide viable operational fires will be depth and synchronization. Next, the paper will analyze an historical example of naval forces employed at the operational level of war in order to evaluate theory in light of historical evidence. Finally, using this model, the paper will suggest a role for naval forces in the Central Region. The conclusion of the paper is that at the operational level of war, naval forces can directly influence the ground war in the Central Region. It is necessary for planners to understand and articulate how best to use our maritime strength to help defeat a continental power like the Soviet Union. (jhd)

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