Abstract
Abstract : Analysis of the Kosovo crisis and the NATO operation reveal that no matter how highly effective and superbly executed, ALLIED FORCE was politically constrained nearly from start to finish. This paper will attempt to argue that while the tenets of operational planning existed, they were not followed during ALLIED FORCE planning. This was due in part because of political constraints, poor operational coordination, and mismanaged resources to achieve ill-defined policy objectives. From March through June 1999, NATO air forces conducted Operation ALLIED FORCE in response to continued aggression against Kosovo Albanians by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) forces under the direction of their President, Slobodan Milosevic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation was to be an air-and missile-only campaign to stop Milosevic's forces from cleansing ethnic Albanians from the Kosovo region and forcing Milosevic to capitulate to NATO and United Nations (UN) demands.
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