Ontologia Romana Ingardena wobec sporu o uniwersalia. W związku z książką Pawła Rojka „Tropy i uniwersalia”

Abstract

This article is an attempt to defend two unfashionable positions in contemporary philosophy: Platonic realism and Ingarden’s rich ontology. This defense is in part prompted by the publication of Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i Uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne (Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations), in which the author maintains that both Platonic realism and Ingarden’s transcendental realism can be considered as a hidden nominalism. However, this statement: a) isbased on a specific interpretation of Platonism, b) narrows down the understanding of universals to only one sense of the term, c) involves misconceptions which are the result of the misinterpretation of Ingarden’s ontology — for instance, it is hypothesized that Ingarden’s main problem with the concept of universals is extreme separateness of properties from qualities (Ingarden’s ideal qualities may be interpreted as universals), d) takes a narrow view of the concept of participation, where the part—whole relationship is almost physical in character.This paper attempts to show: a) that Plato’s and Ingarden’s theory of ideas (Forms) may also be open to other interpretations, b) that the assumption that universals are “one in many,” would make it difficult for anyone to be called a realist, or become a realist (there have been concerns as to whether all kinds of immanent realism correspond to the proposed definition), c) what is the source of various interpretations of participation, d) that arguments for the transcendence of universals are well-founded.