Abstract

This study explores the root causes of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and discusses how the complexity and tight coupling in large-scale systems should be reduced under emergencies such as station blackout (SBO) to prevent future disasters. First, on the basis of a summary of the published literature on the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, we found that the direct causes (i.e., malfunctions and problems) included overlooking the loss of coolant and the nuclear reactor’s failure to cool down. Second, we verified that two characteristics proposed in “normal accident” theory—high complexity and tight coupling—underlay each of the direct causes. These two characteristics were found to have made emergency management more challenging. We discuss how such disasters in large-scale systems with high complexity and tight coupling could be prevented through an organizational and managerial approach that can remove asymmetry of authority and information and foster a climate of openly discussing critical safety issues in nuclear power plants.

Highlights

  • Because Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) did not conduct training regarding the operation of isolation condenser (IC) and the mechanism of the water gauge for measuring the top of active fuel (TAF) in emergency conditions (e.g., station blackout (SBO)), it was impossible for the workers to accurately measure the TAF or determine the state of IC [15,16,18]

  • It was impossible for TEPCO to quickly and appropriately execute the vent operation because it never carried out the training of vent operation under SBO to learn how to open and close motor-operated (MO) and air-operated (AO) valves for ventilation

  • When high complexity and tight coupling are embedded in large-scale systems, the sysWhen high complexity and tight coupling are embedded in large-scale systems, the tem components can interact unpredictably, in emergencies

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Summary

Introduction

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Organizational optimism in excluding emergencies such as SBOs made the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) defenseless against SBO, leading to a serious disaster Such optimism in thinking that SBOs would not occur must have arisen from insufficient consideration of the risks embedded in a large-scale system characterized by high complexity and tight coupling [1,2,6] among system parts or components. According to Perrow [1], nuclear power plants are characterized by both high complexity and tight coupling In these systems, unexpected interactions among failures cause cascades of failures and induce a state with little slack (time and flexibility) in managing emergencies. On the basis of this exploration, we discuss how disasters in complex and tightly coupled systems can be managed and prevented from organizational and managerial viewpoints

Definitions of High Complexity and Tight Coupling
Direct Causes of the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster
Overlooking the Loss-of-Coolant Accident
Failure to Cool the Nuclear Reactor by Feeding Water via a Fire Engine
Delayed Recovery of the DC Power Source
Delayed Vent Operation
Failure to Perform Decompression via an SR Valve
Summary
Section 2.3.5. Failure to decompress the pressure vessel
Summary of the investigation of root causes in the Fukushima
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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