Abstract

The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind (that is, logical positivism and philosophy of ordinary language) were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic. Thus, there were two main frameworks in analytical philosophy of mind: 1) the framework of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy dominated in the 1930s and the 1940s; 2) the framework that dominated since the 1950s and was featured by the critique of the first framework. Thus, the history of analytical philosophy of mind moves between two highly opposite understandings of the mind problematic. The article aims to found the causes of that move in the ideas of C. Hempel and G. Ryle, who were the most notable philosophers of mind in the 1930s and the 1940s.

Highlights

  • Summary The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind

  • It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems

  • The consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic

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Summary

Introduction

В 30-е и 40-е годы движениями логического позитивизма и философии обыденного языка были сформулированы два мощных метода анализа, что привело к резкому снижению интереса к проблеме. Целью этой программы было очищение научной психологии от метафизических высказываний, определяемых как философские теории о структуре и содержании сознания (2). Исследования в области философии сознания ведутся интенсивнее, перестают восприниматься как область исследований второго плана. Это отличие представляется настолько ощутимым, что взятое без исторического контекста, наводит на мысль о разрыве или даже об отсутствии преемственности в аналитической философии сознания.

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