Abstract
Ever since the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern's 'Theory of Games and Economic Behavior' there has been a debate whether, and in what sense, games in extensive form can be reduced to games in normal form. I will provide an argument that the representation of extensive form games by normal form games is in general not adequate. My argument is based on a dynamical concept of genericity (structural stability), which is of importance in evolutionary game theory and the theory of learning in games. Games in extensive form do in general have non-generic dynamical properties, while the dynamics of games in normal form is almost always generic.
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