Abstract
There is an ongoing debate about whether face recognition and object recognition constitute separate domains. Clarification of this issue can have important theoretical implications as face recognition is often used as a prime example of domain-specificity in mind and brain. An important source of input to this debate comes from studies of individuals with developmental prosopagnosia, suggesting that face recognition can be selectively impaired. We put the selectivity hypothesis to test by assessing the performance of 10 individuals with developmental prosopagnosia on demanding tests of visual object processing involving both regular and degraded drawings. None of the individuals exhibited a clear dissociation between face and object recognition, and as a group they were significantly more affected by degradation of objects than control participants. Importantly, we also find positive correlations between the severity of the face recognition impairment and the degree of impaired performance with degraded objects. This suggests that the face and object deficits are systematically related rather than coincidental. We conclude that at present, there is no strong evidence in the literature on developmental prosopagnosia supporting domain-specific accounts of face recognition.
Highlights
It is debated whether face recognition and object recognition constitute separate cognitive domains [1]
The results presented above suggest that our sample of developmental prosopagnosia (DP) performed within the normal range on a quite demanding task of visual object recognition with regular line drawings
These findings suggest that the face and object recognition deficits observed in the DP group are systematically related and unlikely to reflect two associated deficits
Summary
It is debated whether face recognition and object recognition constitute separate cognitive domains [1]. Clarification of this issue can have important theoretical implications as face recognition is often used as a prime example of domain-specificity in mind and brain [2]. Domain-specificity entails the proposition that specialized cognitive functions (and brain areas) can and have evolved to handle very specific types of information; e.g., processing of faces and faces only. As an alternative to domain-specific accounts are theories assuming the existence of more multi- or general-purpose mechanisms which can handle information from several domains; e.g., faces and other types of objects. PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561 October 28, 2016
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