On the Promise of Game Theory in Sociology

Abstract

Students of game theory (GT) investigate strategic interaction between two or more actorsindividual, corporate, or other. 1 In Elster's (e.g., 1985, p. 10) words, GT is a theory for studying interdependent decisions where two or more actors act intentionally. There are four types of interdependencies. First, the reward of each depends on the choices of all, through general social causality. Second, the reward of each depends on the rewards of all, through envy, altruism, and solidarity. Third, the choice (i.e., action) of each depends on the choices of all, through strategic reasoning. Fourth, the desires of each depends on the actions of all, through individual preferences and plans being social in their origins. GT cannot deal with the social origins of preferences, but it deals well with the three other kinds of interdependencies. And even when it comes to the social origins of preferences, GT can give at least some insight into what kinds of social situations are likely to lead actors to change their preferences, as when sympathy for one's co-actors arises in repeated interactions (e.g., Elster 1985, p. 362). Habermas (1981) refers to the kind of interaction analyzed in GT as strategic interaction, and he contrasts it with another primary form of interaction, communicative interaction, where the goal of actors is to reach some consensus or common understanding. It seems rather obvious that strategic interaction is important and probably occurs in a large part of social life. And even what Habermas refers to as communicative interaction often entails strategic elements. So, GT seems to offer a particularly apt framework for analyzing social situations, a framework that by now is widely accepted in economics, political science, parts of social psychology, law, and moral philosophy. Weber (1978, p. 4) states that sociology is the interpretive understanding of social action and that