Introduction to the Application of Game Theory in Fisheries Management

Abstract

The role of game theory (the theory of strategic interaction) in the economics of the management of world capture fisheries resources has evolved gradually over time. If the commencement of modern fisheries economics can be seen to be marked by the publication of H. Scott Gordon’s seminal 1954 article, it can be said that, for the first quarter-century of modern fisheries economics, game theory played a negligible role. There was no perceptible strategic interaction, or at least none seen worth bothering about. All of this changed with the advent of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the EEZ regime. Coastal states establishing EEZs were forced to recognize that some of the fisheries encompassed thereby would be shared with other states. Since strategic interaction between and among states sharing these international fishery resources is central to the management of the resources, fishery economists analysing such management had no choice but to bring game theory to bear. The steadily increasing complexity of international fishery management brought forth the need for game theory models of greater and greater sophistication. The application of game theory to the economics of the management of national, or intra-EEZ, fishery resources, on the other hand, has lagged far behind such application to international fisheries management. This is now changing, as the strategic interaction among the relevant fishers, and between the fishers and the resource managers, can be ignored no longer. The application of game theory to the economic analysis of the management of national fisheries stands as the “new frontier”.