On the Pragmatic Properties of Statements with an Offensive Nomination of a Person (Linguistic Expertise and Invective Functioning of Language).

Abstract

The article is devoted to the description of the pragmatic properties of statements with an offensive nomination of a person. This problem is relevant in both applied and theoretical aspects. To date, the question of the nature of the described speech acts in semantic and pragmatic terms has not been resolved; in particular, the question of whether offensive speech acts are specific speech acts and, if they are, to which class or classes they should belong within the framework of speech act theory is still open. These questions are solved within the framework of the classification of speech acts by J. Searle and J. Austin. The article focuses on the illocutionary purpose and the nature of the perlocutionary effect of the analyzed statements. The explanatory possibilities of classification of illocutionary acts for describing the properties of these statements are considered. It has been established that the description of such statements is more in line with J. Austin's theory of speech acts, according to which the type of statements under study should be recognized as verdicts. The results obtained in the article are relevant for the production of forensic linguistic examinations within those categories of cases that are related to invective functioning of language.