Abstract
In this article, a vacation-type queue length information disclosure policy is considered: Once the queue length drops down to N, the queue-length information is concealed to customers for an exponentially distributed time. Customers decide to join-or-balk according to different information state on their arrivals. We first concentrate on N = 0. The equilibrium behaviors are characterized. In special, the equilibrium joining behaviors of the customers who arrive when the queue length is concealed is mapped into two types of full participation and partial-to-full participation. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the vacation of information disclosure hurts the social welfare, whereas improves the throughput with some proper concealing rate. Next, we allow customers to renege after the queue length information becomes available again. Surprisingly, it is shown that renege does not change the equilibrium strategy and the optimal concealing rate. Lastly, Numerical analysis further displays that the results obtained for N = 0 are also applicable for general N.
Published Version
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