On the normativity of epistemic rationality

Abstract

OF THE DISSERTATION On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality by Kurt Ludwig Sylvan Dissertation Director: Ernest Sosa Many epistemologists equate the rational and the justi ed. Those who disagree have done little to explain the di erence, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinction is an ad hoc one designed to block counterexamples. The rst aim of this dissertation pursued in the rst three chapters is to improve this situation by providing a detailed, independently motivated account of the distinction. The account is unusual in being inspired by no particular theoretical tradition in epistemology, but rather by ideas in the meta-ethical literature on reasons and rationality. The account is also unusual in proposing that the distinction between rationality and justi cation can be derived from a reasons-based account of justi cation. Historically, this is a striking claim. In epistemology, reasons-based accounts of justi cation are standardly treated as paradigmatically internalist accounts, but this dissertation argues that we should believe the reverse: given the best views about reasons again drawn from meta-ethics we should expect reasons-based accounts of justi cation to be strongly externalist. The rst half of the dissertation might leave one wondering why rationality matters from the epistemic point of view. The second aim of the dissertation is to answer this question. The nal two chapters argue (1) that we can only explain why rationality matters from the epistemic point of view if we reject the nearly universal assumption that all derivative epistemic value is instrumental value, and (2) that there are powerful