On the Measure-Theoretic Premises of Bayes Factor and Full Bayesian Significance Tests: a Critical Reevaluation

Abstract

The Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and the Bayesian evidence value recently have received increasing attention across a variety of sciences including psychology. Ly and Wagenmakers (2021) have provided a critical evaluation of the method and concluded that it suffers from four problems which are mostly attributed to the asymptotic relationship of the Bayesian evidence value to the frequentist p-value. While Ly and Wagenmakers (2021) tackle an important question about the best way of statistical hypothesis testing in the cognitive sciences, it is shown in this paper that their arguments are based on a specific measure-theoretic premise. The identified problems hold only under a specific class of prior distributions which are required only when adopting a Bayes factor test. However, the FBST explicitly avoids this premise, which resolves the problems in practical data analysis. In summary, the analysis leads to the more important question whether precise point null hypotheses are realistic for scientific research, and a shift towards the Hodges-Lehmann paradigm may be an appealing solution when there is doubt on the appropriateness of a precise hypothesis.