On the issue of excessive number and low efficiency of civil servants

Abstract

Regarding the modern state management system of the Russian Federation, it is often possible to hear an assessment that there are more "officials", compared to the Soviet era, but their effectiveness is lower. At the same time, the post-Soviet officials themselves are given a subjective negative assessment, and at least most of the civil servants are included in their number. The increase in the number, decrease in efficiency and increase in corruption are recognized in this article as a fact. At the same time, the relationship of the number and effectiveness of "officials" with the current policy of the state apparatus aimed at a low share of state ownership in the market and high independence of regional government bodies, as well as with the current level of remuneration of civil servants, is considered. Arguments are given about the consideration of these phenomena as a natural consequence of such a policy, independent of the personal characteristics of civil servants. It is also argued that even in the current conditions, most of the lower staff of state authorities are quite highly motivated employees. The increased risks of corruption are considered from the point of view of the science of public resources, where the whole state and its institutions are accepted as such. It is argued that the motivation for corruption for a small proportion of officials who have opportunities for it is also related to the general orientation of public policy, although the choice of following this motivation remains for each specific official from the relatively small group that has opportunities for corruption. The consideration of the causes of these phenomena, carried out in the article, allows for a more objective analysis of both the phenomena themselves and ways to reduce their influence.