On the Interpretation of Wittgenstein

Abstract

i. It is often, and sometimes accurately, said that first thoughts are best thoughts. In this paper I shall urge that the first thoughts of Peter Hacker' and (especially) Gordon Baker2 on the interpretation of Wittgenstein are indeed best thoughts, to be preferred to some of their more recent thoughts.3 I do not expect the argument here to be very original. Rather I shall try to use the tools provided by Baker and Hacker to attack their own more recent work. My chosen ground will be the notion of a criterion. I shall urge that this notion only makes sense within a certain view of meaning and understanding; and thus it cannot be given a use which is not '. . . arcane or theory-laden' (B & H (II), p. 7). To some extent, my target is a straw one, for Baker and Hacker admit that they have '. . . drawn a blank cheque upon volume 2 . . .' (B & H (II), p. 7) in their discussion both of 'criterion' and of 'grammar'. But enough of their view is apparent; and more could be drawn out although it is not strictly necessary to do so. It should be noted that, in a certain important way, I am not seeking to defend a traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein. Baker and Hacker rightly offer an interpretation quite different from those standardly given. But this is only because their early work failed to establish itself as the way to read Wittgenstein-at least, failed to do so for most Wittgenstein scholars. Baker and Hacker have taught me, through their early work, to have little sympathy for some views ascribed to Wittgenstein, and have provided a powerful way of interpreting his work in a unified, coherent fashion: namely, in terms of an articulation of a non-standard picture of meaning and understanding. I merely wish to argue that they must continue in that vein, and not take it back in their (justified) impatience with 'philosophical semantics'. But I.will not here seek to argue that Wittgenstein could not be interpreted in their new vein, merely that he should not. It is common ground to both parties that Wittgenstein's work is of central philosophical importance. So I shall content myself with arguing that the new interpretation renders Wittgenstein's work incoherent; a conclusion which I hope Baker and Hacker cannot accept.