On the dual nature of suffrage

Abstract

One measure of a democratic rule of law is how the state defines the framework for the exercise of representative democracy, and who it grants the right to participate in representative democracy (i.e. who it considers to belong to the people). However, this dual nature of the right to vote raises a number of questions. For example, before the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections and during the campaign period, critical voices were heard criticising the system used in Hungarian parliamentary elections (including the institution of winner compensation). By contrast, the fundamental nature of the right to vote, i.e. the subjective aspect, is less often the focus of attention. In this respect, the question rightly arises as to whether the importance of the right to vote as a fundamental right has not been lost. Has the role of different electoral techniques and electoral systems not become a more important issue than the definition and possible extension of the scope of the electorate? Starting from the dual nature of electoral law, the study examines the requirements that can be imposed on electoral systems and the characteristics and challenges of electoral law as a fundamental right.