Abstract

E LECTORAL SYSTEMS influence the kinds of change possible within a political system and the expectations of party elites for access to governmental decision-making. Representational devices contribute to the socialization of attitudes in party elites about the openness or closedness of the system, and thereby affect the willingness of elites to support or reject a constitutionally established system?. Diverse variations on standard representational models are found in Latin America, as are a number of ingenious electoral devices which selectively encourage or discourage party activity and competition. The structures and processes of electoral systems are a distinguishing characteristic of each American nation and a controlling factor in its political change and stability. Traditionally less attention is placed upon the electoral and representational systems in Latin America because the systems vary enormously in their consequences. Presently just under one-third of the republics lack constitutionally elected regimes.2 Moreover, legislatures traditionally have taken a back seat to executives in Latin America. The apparent ease with which legislative decisions have been controlled and overruled by powerful executives, caudillos, or military and economic elites has decimated representation in many republics.3 However, even in those systems where elected regimes have been overthrown, electoral systems still contribute to party behavior and expectations, and are therefore politically if not governmentally relevant.4 I do not wish to attribute a direct causality to electoral systems for political stability or competitive democracy; on the contrary, it can be argued that electoral systems are often designed to reinforce the control of small elites by subtle but effective devices. What I do suggest is that certain types of electoral systems and modifying devices control party activity selectively by determining the political/legal context in which parties operate, and thereby effectively inhibit non-violent change by controlling party participation and competition. If I am correct in assuming that

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