On Relational Autonomy

Abstract

The Twentieth Century is often characterized as a time when autonomy triumphed in biomedical practice. However, its central position has been challenged in the last decade from clinical and philosophical quarters. While empirical findings reveal that most patients, especially those facing serious medical decisions at the bedside, are not making any real autonomous decisions and need and want help and guidance from others. Feminists argue that the traditional individualistic concept of autonomy is a kind of abstraction that deprives and betrays the true identity and needs of the patient. They propose the concept of relational autonomy to restore the patient to her embedded situation as a member of her community. This concept gives due regard to a person’s personal identity and brings in the help of related persons, family members, friends, etc. While there are a number of different versions of the concept of relational autonomy, these treatments are not very satisfactory. This paper argues that the Confucian concept of a person can provide an answer to most of the intricate problems with this concept. A Confucian analysis of the nature of our moral experience supports the primacy of autonomy for a moral being and reveals the relational character of such a being. In doing so, the concept of relational autonomy is aligned with the basic idea of autonomy in the Kantian sense, and the concept of person is being reinterpreted according to the Confucian concept of a person. According to this version of the concept of autonomy, a person’s family is her main source of personal identity.