On Rationales for Cognitive Values in the Assessment of Scientific Representations

Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn

doi:10.1007/s10838-018-9403-6

Abstract

Cognitive values like simplicity, broad scope, and easy handling are properties of a scientific representation that result from the idealization which is involved in the construction of a representation. These properties may facilitate the application of epistemic values to credibility assessments, which provides a rationale for assigning an auxiliary function to cognitive values. In this paper, I defend a further rationale for cognitive values which consists in the assessment of the usefulness of a representation. Usefulness includes the relevance of a representation regarding the investigation of a given problem and its practicability for the users. This rationale builds on the claim that any evaluation of scientific representations should pursue two aims: providing information about their credibility and providing information about their usefulness. Cognitive values relating to the usefulness of a representation and epistemic values relating to its credibility both perform a first-order function. Cognitive values are abstract, and several values with first-order functions may conflict in their application. Thus, in order for cognitive values to account for the sort of problem that is to be investigated by means of a representation, they need to be appropriately specified and weighed. Comprehensiveness, complexity, high resolution, and easy handling, for instance, may be required in a first-order function for model-based prediction of regional climate impacts but not for explaining how the global climate system works. Specifying and weighing cognitive and epistemic values relative to a given problem is a legitimate second-order function of social values.

Highlights

It is a common, albeit not uncontroversial practice to distinguish between epistemic, cognitive, and social values when scientific representations like theories and models are to be evaluated
Cognitive values like simplicity, broad scope, and easy handling are properties of a scientific representation that result from the idealization which is involved in the construction of a representation
Cognitive values relating to the usefulness of a representation and epistemic values relating to its credibility both perform a first-order function

Summary

Introduction

Albeit not uncontroversial practice to distinguish between epistemic, cognitive, and social values when scientific representations like theories and models are to be evaluated. For structuring the relation between specific functions of epistemic, cognitive, and social values on the one hand and credibility and usefulness as their rationales on the other hand, I distinguish between first-order, second-order, and auxiliary functions. Values used in a first-order function provide information about how a scientific representation performs in terms of credibility and usefulness when applied to the problem in hand, i.e. to the hypothesis and the context to be investigated by means of the representation. 2 provides some conceptual clarifications and introduces a conceptual framework that structures uses of values in the evaluation of scientific representations This serves as a basis for discussing the specific functions of cognitive values and their relations to the functions of epistemic and of social values.

Types of Values and Their Functions

Usefulness of a Scientific Representation

Cognitive Values Assessing the Relevance of a Representation

General Implications for Evaluations of Scientific Representations

Conclusion