On logic, intersubjectivity, and meaning: is reality an assumption we just don't need?

Abstract

The idea that our world is not just a mixture of unrelated incidents but shows some intelligible characteristics is probably the starting point of every analysis in International Relations (IR). We assume that what happens shows structure and significant connections of processes and flows. Unfortunately, opinions diverge soon thereafter: how does that assumed structure relate to our minds? Is it independent of our theories, cultural presuppositions, or opinions? What kind of objectivity can we hope for? Critical realists and radical constructivists seem to entertain different ideas about what the ‘ontological status of reality’ is and whether and how we can know about it. An intellectual encounter between Colin Wight and Friedrich Kratochwil has shown to what extent related questions about intersubjectivity, reference, and meaning touch upon questions aboutthe logos. Interestingly enough, both agree that the ‘classic’ bivalent logic provides only an insufficient grounding for an adequate understanding of the world. Yet both are silent on providing reasons why this is the case. Hence, it might well be that constructivists and critical realists actually do share some reservation or critique.