On doubting what there is not: The doctrine of doubt and the reference of terms in Indian grammar, logic and philosophy of language

Abstract

Whenever the issue of doubt (samsaya, sandeha) is addressed in classical Indian philosophy, a sophisticated and refined theory is referred to, a theory which not only unequivocally defines doubt, but also attempts to clarify its origins and the conditions of its resolution. This theory the doctrine of doubt, as it shall be called later on is unanimously subscribed to by most systems of classical Indian philosophy, not only by 'orthodox' darsanas such as Nyâya, Vaisesika, Sâmkhya, Vedânta, but also by Jainism and Buddhism. Accordingly, it may be regarded as a specimen of common philosophical methodology that is apparently free of specific philosophical assumptions and tenets.1 In addition, the doctrine of doubt is characterized by another important feature indicating quite remarkable philosophical interconnections: its logical structure is paralleled by, or isomorphic to, at least two other logico-philosophical theories of even greater purport, the theories of negation and error. Upon due consideration and examination of the important texts at hand, the present paper attempts to outline and reconstruct the classical Indian doctrine of doubt along with two of its major extensions by proceeding as follows. First, the basic theory as dealt with in the relevant texts shall be treated and exemplified. This account will reveal a philosophical problem of utmost importance that arises within the basic theory of doubt and that merits thorough investigation. The classical theory of doubt thus outlined will then be extended in two different directions, covering two theories isomorphic to the theory of doubt, namely, the theories of negation and error, which belong to the disciplines of logic and epistemology.