Abstract
As RFID technology is being widely used in access control systems to identify and track both objects and people, relay attacks on RFID systems continue to pose serious threats to security. To mitigate relay attacks, distance bounding protocols can be used. Until recently, all distance bounding protocols were based on classical cryptography and communication techniques. In this paper, we take a closer look at a recently proposed protocol by Jannati and Ardeshir-Larijani [Quantum Information Processing 2016, 18] to detect relay attacks using qubits. We first observe that the protocol has a weakness which allows an adversary to mount a successful attack on the protocol. We then propose a countermeasure to restore security and compare the fixed protocol with the state of the art.
Highlights
Today wireless embedded systems are ubiquitous in almost all aspects of our daily lives
We begin by recalling the distance bounding protocol by Hancke and Kuhn [3], since it is most relevant to the RAD protocol
Relay attacks can be mitigated by using distance bounding (DB) protocols, which involves accurate round-trip time (RTT) measurement
Summary
Today wireless embedded systems are ubiquitous in almost all aspects of our daily lives. As a countermeasure against relay attacks, a distance bounding (DB) protocol is introduced by Brands and Chaum in [2]. Secure implementation of the fast-bit exchange phase for distance bounding has been a challenge. In [18], Jannati and Ardeshir-Larijani propose to use qubits for detecting relay attacks on RFID systems. They propose a RAD (relay attack detection) protocol which basically replaces the fast-bit exchange phase of a DB protocol with a phase in which the prover sends qubits to the verifier.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
