On being a fictional character

Abstract

Summary Reference, names and truth in fictional contexts are philosophically puzzling because unlike the case in ordinary situations, there are no such things as fictional characters to which we can refer, about which we can make truth claims and which can be named, and yet, the language we use about fictional characters seems to be meaningful in the same way as the language we use to talk about actual existent people and events. Although fictional realism, in claiming that fictional characters and events are (ike real ones in that they have properties, has the advantage that it can accommodate reference, truth and names for fictional characters it does so at the cost of ontological expansion. Furthermore, since the differences between radical and nonradical completeness are ignored by fictional realists, the Law of Excluded Middle is breached. This article, after examining a paradigm example of fictional realism and exposing its weaknesses, argues that if fictional characters are explained, not as having their properties but as being the total of their properties, ontological expansion is avoided, the Law of Excluded Middle can be retained and reference, truth and names in fictional contexts maintained.