Abstract
According to fictional realism, the realm of objects includes fictional characters. In ‘Against Fictional Realism’, Anthony Everett argues against fictional realism, in part on the grounds that it is committed to the claim that fictional characters can be indeterminately identical. In ‘In Defence of Fictional Realism’, Benjamin Schnieder and Tatjana von Solodkoff defend fictional realism by denying that it is committed to that claim. In this paper, we argue that their view is arbitrary, since there is no reason to prefer their principles to alternative ones. As a result, fictional realists who deny that fictional characters can be indeterminately identical need another response to Everett’s argument.
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