Abstract
I show that in the context of proof-theoretic semantics, Dummett’s distinction between the assertoric meaning of a sentence (it’s meaning when viewed as “stand alone”) and its ingredient sense (its meaning when viewed as a constituent of an embedding sentence) can be seen as a distinction between two proof-theoretic meanings of a sentence: 1. Meaning as a conclusion of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. 2. Meaning as a premise of an introduction rule in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof system. The effect of this distinction on compositionality of proof-theoretic meaning is discussed.
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