Abstract

In this paper, I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms. I argue that there are philosophically interesting notions of free will that are compatible with determinism. These are the notions of free will that matter to ordinary life, and I argue that these generate a way for a philosophically interesting understanding of free will to be compatible with belief in God’s infallible foreknowledge. I discuss two key questions—the empirical question and the divine interference question—that are often neglected in the contemporary debate on foreknowledge and free will. Finally, I provide some answers to these questions that I hope can advance the debate.

Highlights

  • In this paper, I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms

  • Since God’s omniscience is unconstrained by time and space, the implication for human action would be that it be, from God’s perspective, infinitely determined, meaning that the realm of human action would fall under the rule of determinism

  • I argue that there exist philosophically interesting notions of free will that are compatible with determinism

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Summary

Introduction

I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms. Contemporary incompatibilist arguments about God’s foreknowledge and human freedom seek to show that if an essentially omniscient being (God) has infallible advance knowledge of any given action we perform we (humans) cannot be said to act freely.

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Conclusion

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