Oman: Transitioning from Sultan Qaboos

Abstract

In 1995, no doubt anticipating this special issue of AWG, the Omani government kindly drafted Oman Vision 2020. Alas, this document is mostly an irrelevant testament to the optimism of its authors and a reminder that reality will always intrude. In fact, Oman fell so far short of its goals for 2020 that it is currently drafting a new strategy, Oman Vision 2040 (Valeri 2015). As Yogi Berra reputedly said, “It is tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” To do so in the Middle East, where the pace of political change has been particularly rapid in the past few years, is arguably even more perilous, whether the horizon is 2020, 2030, or next week. Nevertheless, there seems to be broad consensus about the nature of the challenges confronting Oman in the near future, and how the sultanate looks in 2020 or 2030 will largely be determined by how successfully these challenges are addressed. Most pressing is the issue of who will succeed the 74-year-old Sultan Qaboos, who has ruled Oman almost single-handedly since 1970 (Nereim 2014). In 2014, he spent several months in Germany receiving medical treatment for what is widely believed to be colon cancer. In November, looking emaciated, he announced to the nation that he would not attend Omani National Day celebrations, explaining his absence “for reasons you all know” (Nereim 2014). It is difficult to overstate the degree to which Oman’s entire political system has been personalized and focused on the sultan for the past four decades. Unfortunately he has no brothers, no sons, and no designated heir. According to Omani Basic Law, a royal family council must select a successor within three days of Sultan Qaboos’s death. If they are unable to do so, an envelope containing the sultan’s preferred choice will be opened. Although the transition will most likely be peaceful, many Omanis fear that the process, and the uncertainly surrounding it, could trigger infighting within the royal family. In the worst (but unlikely) scenario, any succession dispute could in turn provide an opening for the resurgence of long-suppressed tribal feuds and regional rivalries, notably in Dhofar, where a rebellion raged for 13 years before 1975, and in the interior, where Ibadi Muslims lived