Old Wine in New Bottles? The Theoretical Shift Towards Decisive Battle

Abstract

Abstract : This monograph analyzes classical warfare and modern warfare to determine whether there is a theoretical shift occurring that is blending the tenets of both of these theories of war. Exploitation of the inherent strengths of each of these theories of warfare could lead to a more cogent form of warfare appropriate for the U.S. Army as it implements its current transformation. The use of military force, or the threat of military force, has been a dominant feature of societies from the most primitive to the highly advanced. Whether organized along primitive tribal groupings for use only during time of war, or whether organized from complex industrial societies as professional standing armies, all military forces have theoretical underpinnings. Without a coherent theory of war, it is impossible to employ organized military force in an effective fashion. The military force operating from the most effective and appropriate military theory has the greater chance of victory. The two most dominant theories of war for conventional forces are those of classical warfare, enumerated by decisive battle, and modern warfare aptly defined within the operational art. The use of the concept of tenets is most useful as the monograph defines decisive and operational warfare. The monograph must first explore the definition of classical warfare and decisive battle. The monograph develops a definition for decisive battle utilizing historical example and then determines the tenets that propagate the theory of classical warfare. Analyzing in detail the component parts or tenets of the theory of classical warfare determines the theoretical basis for how the militaries of the past conducted warfare either successfully or unsuccessfully. Next, the monograph defines operational war, identifies its basic tenets and provides historical examples of the conduct