Offenbares Geheimnis (Open Secret)

Abstract

The phrase “offenbares Geheimnis” (open secret) is central and unique to Goethe’s thought. This was indicated for the first time by the Grimm dictionary, which labels it “ein Göthen beliebter unentbehrlicher begriff” (a concept that is dear and indispensable to Goethe) and quotes several occurrences of it in Goethe’s corpus. Linguistically, it is an oxymoron, that is, a syntagm juxtaposing two contradictory ideas. It comprises “offenbar” (open, evident), an adjective qualifying what is to the highest degree open, evident, clear—“ein verstärktes offen” (a reinforced open), according to the Grimms—and “Geheimnis,” a noun referring to something hidden, inaccessible, mysterious (the term translates “mysterium” in Luther’s Bible). “Open secret” thus refers to the paradoxical condition of what is simultaneously concealed and unconcealed. Goethe employs this phrase and other ones closely connected to it—“öffentliches Geheimniß” (public secret), “offenbares Räthsel” (open mystery), “geheimnißvoll offenbar” (secretly open)—in two primary senses: (1) “offenbares Geheimnis” indicates a secret that can cease (or has already ceased) to be a secret—a secret that is actually accessible to someone under certain conditions; (2) in a second, more radical sense, “offenbares Geheimnis” denotes a secret that cannot be definitively removed from its secrecy. Schematically, it could be said that this phrase can indicate either (1) an “offenbares Geheimnis” (open secret) or (2) an “offenbares Geheimnis” (open secret). The first meaning can refer to two rather distinct situations in Goethe’s writings. What provisionally prevents something from fully manifesting itself can be either (1.a) a deliberate act of concealment (a dissimulation, an encryption, an effort to keep something and/or someone in the dark) or (1.b) the opaque nature of what is hidden, which requires effort to be definitively brought to light. According to all these different meanings, “offenbares Geheimnis” can assume an epistemological (1.a), phenomenological (1.b) or ontological (2) value.