Odd Man In

Abstract

Even the on-again-off-again acceptance of the principle of a common policy by the many states of the EEC is no model for a continent consisting of one superpower and one middle power. Canada thus becomes the odd man out, the unsymmetrical element the pattern. This creates a problem for Canadians of being disregarded. It presents a real problem for Americans and Europeans also of seeing how (or even remembering) to fit this stubborn piece into the framework.(1)SINCE JOHN HOLMES WROTE THOSE WORDS, the Atlantic community, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization its core, has survived another 30 years without resolving the problem he described. That is testimony to the durability both of the alliance and of the problem. For an alliance, of course, long life is evidence of some success--an indication that it has provided its members with enduring security, and perhaps even met the exacting standards of a true security community.(2) It is also likely to have survived many critical junctures during which seasoned observers pronounced it to be once more at the cross-roads or in the balance. Over its 54 years NATO has accumulated not only institutions, tasks and members but also a rich experience of coping with adversity.That the alliance is once more crisis is beyond dispute. Although the transatlantic volleys exchanged over the Iraq question have abated somewhat since their peak the spring of 2003, the issues that divide the allies remain plain view. But if observers agree that the transatlantic relationship is trouble, they disagree on why, on how endangered the alliance really is and on what should be done about it.(3) On the one hand, most leaders--whether ritualistically or from deep conviction--persist proclaiming the Atlantic community to be indispensable--the peaceful, prosperous and democratic core of the current world order. On the other hand, deeply embedded the present American administration is a school of thought that tends to see NATO less as a community than as a collection of allies from which to select coalitions of the willing.(4) It is inclined to dismiss the alliance per se as just another multilateral impediment to America's new mission of preemptive and preventive action abroad--a perception that the actions of some European governments and the opinions of their citizens have done little to dispel.In Canada, sounds of discord NATO always echo loudly, given this country's unique and long-standing commitment to the idea of an Atlantic community. From its origins 1949, Canadian governments could, as others did, value the North Atlantic Treaty as linking the strategic fates of North America and western Europe, as supplementing UN security provisions and as anchoring containment. But NATO also served the fundamental Canadian interest open, multilateral relations between America and Europe. Even better, then, if the bare bones of the treaty and its security guarantee could subsequently be fleshed out with a complex of military and civilian institutions, if new European members could be brought and if the alliance could become the centrepiece of a community of like-minded states bound by economic interdependence and a common commitment to liberal, democratic values.(5) Each time these arrangements have seemed threatened, Canada could fairly claim to have more stake than any other ally.What do the current troubles of the North Atlantic community mean for Canada, and how should the government respond? This paper suggests that, unusually for NATO, these problems have to do less with differences among allies as to the threats they face or the alliance's proper role the world, than with long-term structural change on each side of the Atlantic. The result is a true existential crisis, exacerbated by events of the last two years and by a number of persistent irritants. This situation puts risk the form of transatlantic multilateralism Canada has long favoured. …