Observer‐based attack‐resilient control for linear systems against FDI attacks on communication links from controller to actuators

Abstract

SummaryFor the adversarial attacks on the communication links from the controller to the actuators, most of the existing attack‐resilient control results focus on denial‐of‐service attacks. Unlike the existing results, this paper studies the observer‐based attack‐resilient control problem for linear systems with false data injection attacks and process disturbances. Due to limited resources, the malicious attacker is assumed to only manipulate a certain number of communication links from the controller to the actuators. A novel control architecture is proposed, which consists of an attack‐resilient state observer, a controller gain scheme, and a supervisory switching strategy. The observer is developed based on the maximin strategy, and state estimation will be used to construct the controller. The switching strategy is designed to pick an appropriate controller gain and prevent the attack signals from entering the plant automatically. It is shown that the closed‐loop system is stable with an attack‐resilient performance. Finally, to verify the effectiveness of the proposed controller, simulation results on a linearized reduced‐order aircraft system and an IEEE six‐bus power system are provided.