Abstract
What happens to our notion of political obligation when right is divorced from moral considerations? When one says that an individual’s claim to her property is a right that ought not to be abridged, on what kind of nonmoral principle can one rely? According to Matthew Sean Pines, Fichte believes that he can ground such a normative prescription on a theory of natural right, deriving a set of strict political principles from a necessary metaphysical conception of a rational being. It is the main task of this paper to work through this difficult deduction, assess its validity, and discuss the general implications of its result. What is said here concerning Fichte’s specific proposal for an objective theory of natural—as opposed to moral—right bears broader significance for the fundamental problem of the nature and source of obligation in the political world.
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