Obligation according to G. W. F. Hegel’ Doctrine

Abstract

The article is devoted to the analysis of the nature of the category of obligation according to the doctrine of the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. The author emphasizes that using the two concepts "obligation" (Verpflichtung) and "duty" (Pflicht), G.V.F. Hegel believes that the first has a legal basis, while the second has a moral basis. The key difference between them is the presence of a certain mindset, that is, a subjective belief, setting. As for the categories "right" and "obligation", they eventually merge in the thinker and they are formally identified (who has no rights, has no obligations), condition and predict each other (although the scientist emphasizes their content difference). The factor of such value identification and fusion is mediation, that is, the presence of a certain external reality, thanks to which the right turns into an obligation, and the obligation into a right. In the relationship between the concepts of freedom and obligation, the role of the necessary condition for the existence of affirmative freedom is assigned to the obligation. After all, the obligation, in fact, is not a limitation of freedom, but only of its abstraction.
 At the same time, the obligation according to G. W. F. Hegel’ doctrine is closely intertwined with a number of ethical categories - good, conscience, virtue, etc. Good is the universal goal of the world and human activity in particular, and therefore it is the goal of setting and fulfilling obligations. Virtue is the state of a person for whom obligation has become a substantial attribute of his existence. Whereas conscience is a kind of "path" to understanding obligation and good.
 And finally, the philosopher is convinced that individuals have obligations towards the state to the same extent that they have rights. The internal strength of the state lies in the concept of the unity of obligation and right. The formula of the abstract universal obligation is reduced to the need to sacrifice oneself for the sake of preserving the individuality of the state. While maintaining the dominance of the whole (the state) over the part (the individual), the scientist, nevertheless, tries to show that the special interest of the individual should not be rejected, but also taken into account, to some extent adapted to the interests of the whole, collective, general. And it is possible in such a combination to achieve the dreamed good - both individual and social.