Abstract

In this paper I discuss and develop the risk account of scientific objectivity, which I have recently introduced, contrasting it to some alternatives. I then use the account in order to analyse a practice that is relatively common in anthropology, in the history of science, and in the sociology of scientific knowledge: withholding epistemic judgement. I argue that withholding epistemic judgement on the beliefs one is studying can be a relatively efficient strategy against collective bias in these fields. However, taking into account the criticisms presented against the strategy, I also argue that it is a usable strategy only when the distance between the researchers and their ideas, and the people and ideas being studied, is significant enough.

Highlights

  • Much of the philosophical literature on scientific objectivity is based on the dismissal of one or another of two important accounts of objectivity

  • I have recently (Koskinen 2018) defended a negative account that I call the risk account of scientific objectivity: When we call X objective, we say that we rely on X, and that others can safely do so too, because we believe that important epistemic risks arising from our imperfections as epistemic agents have been effectively mitigated or averted

  • Withholding epistemic judgement can be an effective strategy for mitigating collective bias, but it is needed only in some contexts, and is a usable strategy only in some contexts

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Summary

Introduction

Much of the philosophical literature on scientific objectivity is based on the dismissal of one or another of two important accounts of objectivity. All the senses of objectivity discussed in the recent literature identify either some risk of this type, or some efficient strategy for averting or mitigating one or more such risks This “risk account” represents objectivity as a contextual matter: our diverse imperfections as epistemic agents lead to diverse epistemic risks, some of which become important in some contexts, and other ones in others. The strategy of withholding epistemic judgement reflects the perceived importance of averting or mitigating collective bias in the humanities and qualitative social sciences. I use it to analyse the practice of withholding epistemic judgement as a strategy for mitigating collective bias in anthropology, history of science and the sociology of scientific knowledge

Applicable senses of scientific objectivity
Positive and negative accounts
The risk account of scientific objectivity
The idea of collective bias
Withholding epistemic judgement as a strategy for mitigating collective bias
Limits of the strategy
Conclusions
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