O voto remoto pode mitigar os problemas de agência?

Abstract

ABSTRACT Purpose: Board members are critical in resolving agency conflicts. How- ever, many are unable to perform their function due to their distance, as they are not present at board meetings. As of Instruction no. 561, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) regulated remote voting for Boards of Directors, allowing for greater attendance at meet- ings and, as a result, increased involvement. In this context, this research examines the effect of remote voting by Boards of Directors on execu- tive compensation and financial performance of publicly traded firms in Brazil. Originality/value: This research is innovative in the sense that it exam- ines the effect of the Board of Directors remote voting on the CEO com- pensation and financial performance of the firm, using an innovative methodology. Design/methodology/approach: We applied a quasi-experimental method (difference-in-differences) to assess the effects of a given group (treat- ment) before and after the event, significantly reducing endogeneity when considering an exogenous shock to the system. Findings: As a result, the estimation of the main model reveals statisti- cally significant differences between the effects of treatment and control on profitability and executive remuneration, indicating that remote vot- ing mitigated agency problems by generating a substitution effect for explicit incentives (as evidenced by the decrease in executive remunera- tion) and by providing greater accounting performance for companies.