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Abstract

Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of mak-ing such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical im-plications than refl ections about morality in general. In this chapter I pursue this strategy with regard to a particularly important matter, namely climate change. First, I establish general conditions for when a moral judgement has any eff ect on those who accept it. Second, I show that the judgement that in-dividuals in industrialized countries are morally obliged to act against climate change does not fulfi l these conditions, and is thus neither benefi cial nor harm-ful. Finally, I sketch several strategies for increasing people’s non-moral moti-vation to act against climate.