Nudging Charitable Giving: What (If Anything) Is Wrong With It?

Rebecca C. Ruehle,Bart Engelen,Alfred Archer

doi:10.1177/0899764020954266

Rebecca C. Ruehle, Bart Engelen + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764020954266

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Abstract

Nudging techniques can help charities to increase donations. In this article, we first provide a systematic overview of prototypical nudges that promote charitable giving. Second, we argue that plenty of the ethical objections raised against nudges, such as the exploitation of power they involve and the arguably intrusive and deceptive nature, are not specific to nudging itself. Carefully designing nudges can help to avoid these worries. Third, given that most concerns boil down to the worry that nudges infringe on people’s autonomy, we analyze when this could nevertheless be justified. We differentiate between perfect duties, imperfect duties, and supererogatory acts and argue that nudges are (a) morally permissible (even when they violate autonomy) when it comes to perfect duties and can (b) provide the best available strategy when it comes to imperfect duties. That said, we also analyze the conditions under which nudging charitable giving is impermissible.

Highlights

As there is fierce competition between charities and scarce donor resources (Thornton, 2006), nonprofit organizations often need to rely on fundraising to ensure the ongoing support for the good causes they are fighting for
We offer a systematic analysis of the most common nudging techniques used by charities
We carefully disentangle the main ethical worries raised in the literature and relate them to supposed infringements of donors’ autonomy

Summary

Introduction

As there is fierce competition between charities and scarce donor resources (Thornton, 2006), nonprofit organizations often need to rely on fundraising to ensure the ongoing support for the good causes they are fighting for. As the ethical evaluation of charitable nudging is still controversial, we develop a framework for when it is morally permissible to nudge people toward donating to charity, depending on the moral worth of the cause they are supporting (section “Perfect and Imperfect Duties and Supererogation”). Krishnamurthy argues that nudging people to donate to charity runs the risk of infringing upon their autonomy.

Results

Conclusion