Nuclear weapons in a changing world: Consequences for development

Abstract

The end of the Cold War and the conduct and termination of the Gulf conflict ushered in the promise of a substantially changed and more stable international environment. With such a promise also came the hope of a substantial diversion of resources away from military expenditure and into human development. Unfortunately, the hope for a peace dividend to be used for the reinvigoration of the world's economy, by fostering unprecedented growth and development, has given way to a more sober view reflecting the high costs inherent in dramatic systemic change. Focusing on the process of nuclear disarmament and the efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons technologies, this paper seeks to highlight the shortcomings that have to date prevented the anticipated cost savings and diversion of resources to human development. To summarize, the most important findings of this report include: The current export control regime is inadequate and discriminatory over the long-run. Legitimate security concerns must be addressed before lasting reductions can be achieved. Adherence to nonproliferation norms can prove a boon, rather than a burden, to national economies. Extensive linkages between nuclear and non-nuclear proliferation and disarmament point to the need for a more comprehensive approach in order to effect mutually beneficial and lasting change. While unilateral initiatives, and provisions of the INF, START I, and START II treaties call for the reduction of over 20,000 warheads from the arsenals of nuclear weapons states, they make no provision for the ultimate disposition of the fissile materials released as a result of this process. Although potentially dramatic, the reductions envisioned in the START I and II treaties have yet to result in the dismantlement of a single warhead. Although lessening the immediate threat of nuclear conflagration, these agreements fail to address the long-term environmental and security threats posed by inadequate storage or the potential dispersal of fissile materials to unintended parties. Continuing moratoria on the part of the United States, Britain, France, and Russia bode well for a suspension of the nuclear arms race and the eventual conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) treaty. Despite the steep costs associated with dismantling and safe storage of nuclear weapons retired as a result of either unilateral initiatives or bilateral or multilateral disarmament agreements, the long-term savings accrued could be substantial if the materials released by this process are adequately controlled. The precarious state of civilian nuclear power worldwide may complicate efforts at controlling the spread of fissile materials. Despite the high financial and technical barriers to proliferation, a handful of states continue to harbor clandestine nuclear weapons programs or are widely believed to be actively seeking one. This may bar further reducNUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPMENT*