Nuclear Submarines and their Implications for Weapons Proliferation

Abstract

The implications of the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for nuclear weapons proliferation is one element in the recent debate about whether various non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) should acquire SSNs. The general issue can be stated as follows: given their cost, environmental impact and possible connection to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, are SSNs the most appropriate military technology for meeting realistic threats to the national security of particular NNWS? When stated in this manner, the debate about the wisdom of SSN acquisition is strongly reminiscent of the long-standing controversy about the desirability of nuclear power as an energy source in both developed and developing countries, particularly NNWS. In this paper I consider the similarities and differences between nuclear power and SSN acquisition as possible avenues to nuclear weapons proliferation in order to gain insight into the significance of the SSN/weapons linkage. Specifically, I address the following issues: 1. What is the impact on weapons proliferation of the requirement for uranium enrichment and the possible use of spent fuel reprocessing in nuclear power and submarine reactor fuel cycles? 2. Can international and/or bilateral safeguards deter the diversion of nuclear materials from these fuel cycles? 3. Can SSNs and nuclear power facilities serve as political surrogates for nuclear weapons, or, conversely, will they facilitate the acquisition of such weapons?