Becoming a non-nuclear weapon state: Britain, the NPT and safeguards

Abstract

The next general election in Britain may bring to power a Labour government committed to implementing a policy of nuclear disarmament. In this article, without commenting on the merits of such a policy, we wish to examine how the renunciation of Britain's nuclear armaments might be given force under international law. Could Britain change its standing under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from a nuclear weapon state to a non-nuclear weapon state? Once its nuclear weapons had been dismantled, could Britain place its nuclear materials and facilities under the same international safeguards that are applied to materials and facilities in, for instance, Belgium and West Germany? Once the policy had taken effect, how easily could it be reversed under international law by a subsequent British government-and with what consequences for the international non-proliferation regime? These questions relate to the scrapping of Britain's own nuclear armaments. The stationing of American nuclear weapons at bases on the territory of the United Kingdom is a separate issue which will not concern us. It has, in any case, no bearing on the legal issue discussed here. West Germany, for example, has large numbers of American nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, but is recognized as a non-nuclear weapon state under the Treaty because the United States owns and has physical control over the weapons.