Nuclear Power and Japan's Proliferation Option

Abstract

NUCLEAR POWER IS perceived as more a matter of vital national security in Japan than it is in many other countries. In one respect, it is viewed by the government and the business community as the most viable alternative to what will become increasingly scarce supplies of oil, over which Japan can realistically expect to have little control. At present, Japan imports 99.7% of its oil and depends on it for 72.2% of its primary power; sometime in the next decade, Japan will probably supplant the U.S. as the world's biggest importer of crude oil and products, despite conservation measures and a projected tripling in nuclear power generation.' In another respect, increased reliance on uranium for power will help obviate Japanese fears that its lifeline from the Middle East will cut off, and will thus reduce the incentives for Japan to expand its long-range naval and air patrol capabilities and relieve anxieties about being dependent on countries, among them the U.S., which have learned to use oil as a weapon. Japan has long-term contracts for about 149,000 tons of yellowcake uranium, enough to meet its demand beyond 1990. In sharp contrast, in fiscal year 1976, Japan imported nearly one million tons of oil a day, most of it on a spot or noncontract basis.2 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Science and Technology Agency are optimistic that through reprocessing spent reactor fuel, the commercialization of the fast breeder reactor