Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Civil-Military Relations and Decision-Making

Abstract

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and its allies hope that the nuclear arms race, with its attendant risks of accident, terrorism, and environmental pollution, will be reversed and ultimately eliminated. However, the developed nations are seriously concerned about a different kind of proliferation in South Asia: the possibility of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. The U.S. and its allies argue that the deeply ingrained, traditional hostility between India and Pakistan accentuates the dangers inherent in a South Asian nuclear proliferation. In addition, they worry about the inadequacy of safeguards against accidents, the lack of circumspect behavior in decision-making, and whether command and control arrangements are sufficient to prevent a possible nuclear conflagration because of misperception, miscalculation, or both. In India, civilian control over the production and deployment of nuclear weapons appears absolute. Although it is inconceivable that the military will not have a role in integrating nuclear weapons into the overall war fighting strategy, the extent of its involvement in the design and deployment of nuclear weapons is not known. In Pakistan, however, the military has had a substantial role in politics. In 1958 the martial law regime under Ayub Khan sought and obtained the full cooperation of the bureaucracy, which benefited from the military rule. Again in 1970, Yahya Khan was chiefly guided by military advisers, although he had some civilian members in his cabinet. Although civilians were the initiators of the nuclear program, the Pakistan