Nozick, Entitlement Theory and the Justification for Maximizing Individual Freedoms

Abstract

The purpose of this paper was, in explaining Robert Nozick’s ‘Entitlement theory’, to argue whether his ideas of ‘just acquisition’ and ‘self-ownership’ provided sufficient justification for maximizing individual freedom. In this paper I examined the key principles of Entitlement theory Nozick uses, in conjuncture to his concepts of ‘self-ownership and ‘just acquisition’, to justify his conception of freedom. I performed this by exploring the implications of these principles and the extent to which they are logically coherent with the rest of his theory after first laying out the definitions of the terms Nozick uses as a foundation. Although I found that Nozick provides a couple of compelling cases that support his theory, Entitlement theory in general falls short of complete justification for maximized personal freedoms due to unaddressed problems with his concepts of ‘self-ownership’ and ‘just acquisition’. Namely, that the extent which to these concepts apply eventually create situations in which the natural execution of Nozick’s acquisition and transfer rights can impede on the rights of others, undermining his theory.